With this article, we attempt to revitalize this macropolitical perspective by examining pat terns of conflict over the span of decades rather than across a handful of years as in mainstream The shift to a territorial logic allows one to hold a spatial unit constant and observe over time how it is governed, whether by an empire, a mod ern nation-state, or some other form of polity. We can thus determine whether periods of institu tional transformation from one type of gover nance to another are indeed more likely to be accompanied by war. Before we proceed to a description of the data set, we note two possible objections to our choice of observational units.
First, the territories do not always correspond to process units (i.e., the units within which the relevant political dynamics unfold). The Russo Japanese war, to give the most striking example from our data set, was entirely fought on the ter ritory of current China, and is thus attributed to China rather than to the territory of Russia or Japan, where the decisions of going to war were We were surprised, however, that the overall decline in the war rate is not as steep after nation-state creation as we had anticipated. We had expected that after two generations, the conflict potential that nation-state formation entails would have been absorbed through seces splines, or restricted cubic splines, are con structed of piecewise cubic polynomials such that the function, its derivative, and its second derivative are continuous at each of the speci fied knots. In addition, the spline function is constrained to be linear beyond the end points, simplifying their calculation. Splines are an efficient way to estimate nonlinear time depend ence, which can be traced easily using the esti mated spline coefficients, as we will show later in this article. In addition to tracing time dependency, we coded the variable that tracks the central mech anism linking nation-state formation to war in our model: political discrimination against minority groups. We generate a political dis crimination variable from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set collected by Ted Gurr and col laborators.17 Unfortunately, MAR's data begin only in 1950 and are coded for independent countries only, so we can test this variable only on a subset of our data after remapping the MAR codings to conform to our territorial logic.18 As discussed in the theory section, the degree of political discrimination along ethnic lines varies under the influence of other factors. First, the governments of rich countries can afford to discriminate less and co-opt ethno-political protest movements through redistribution. We expect per capita GDP to be correlated nega tively with the likelihood of war. To make the spline coefficients easier to interpret, we again plot the predicted probabil ities of war onset against time to nation-state creation in Figure 6B , on the basis of estimates from Model 6. We note that the spline coeffi cients are only weakly significant, but that the shape of the calculated probability of war is as expected by our model. The two graphs of Figure 6 
